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ABSTRACT 
It is often argued that there is a convergence of interest between business in South 
Africa and the upholders of apartheid. So of the various measures employed in the 
international effort to end apartheid, codes of conduct governing companies operating in 
South Africa represent something of a challenge to this relationship. They attempt, 
within a strategy of constructive engagement, to dismantle apartheid within individual 
firms in South Africa and set an example to South African firms and South Africa at 
large. However, perhaps because of this link between business and apartheid, codes are 
widely considered ineffective. This paper is a reassessment of the EEC Code of 
Conduct and the scope for its contribution to the creation of a non-racial, democratic 
nation of South Africa. 
The code’s origins, purpose and form are described. It is emphasised that the code is 
voluntary and largely concerned with employment practices. Views on the code and its 
effectiveness vary; the paper attempts to identify the perspectives of all the various 
interested parties: government at national and European level, firms and corporate 
interest groups, public interest groups, trade unions, and, in South Africa, the 
perspectives of the government, business and those representing black interests. The 
code’s outcomes - beneficial and adverse - are considered, insofar as they can be 
established. 
Conclusions drawn note that it is unrealistic to expect the EEC code to have a 
significant impact on apartheid. This situation is unlikely to change unless the code 
becomes mandatory and its provisions more stringent and wide-ranging, and even then, 
this assumes constructive engagement is a viable strategy for dismantling apartheid. The 
reluctance of the EEC to act in such a way with other measures employed against 
apartheid would suggest the prospects of strengthening the code are remote. However, 
this largely unsurprising conclusion is tempered by the observation that the code does at 
least contribute to the international pressure for change in South Africa within a 
constructive engagement strategy. Its main value lies in its expressive function - as a 
statement about the morality of apartheid. Moreover, codes per se are not necessarily 
ineffective. Yet if they are to achieve anything they must have substantive provisions 
and enforceable sanctions against those that fail to meet them. In other words, codes 
must have teeth! 
A POSITIVE MEASURE 
A great variety of sanctions are available to those outside South Africa that wish to 
encourage the South African government to end apartheid (1). Many have been adopted 
by trade unions, pension funds, local or state government, public interest groups and 
individuals, as well as national governments and international bodies such as the UN. 
The ‘encouragement’ intended by these sanctions may be in the form of relatively 
welcome inducements to speed up what is seen as a process of reform in South Africa or 
it may take the form of less gentle persuasion with a view to convincing the South 
African authorities of the need to act to dismantle apartheid. Alternatively, more 
outright coercion may be intended. Such sanctions seek to force the South African 
government to end apartheid or create the conditions for the government’s overthrow 
and its replacement by majority rule. Hence the manifest intent of sanctions on South 
Africa may be negative and punitive or it may be positive and as an incentive to change. 
Clearly a variety of purposes may underlie the use of any particular measure, according 
to the interests at stake. Ostensibly however, codes of conduct governing multinational 
corporations (MNCs) operating in South Africa, are a positive measure. 
It is often suggested that South Africa’s apartheid system has always been a mutually 
beneficial alliance between a minority government and private business; that there is a 
convergence of interest between business in South Africa and the upholders of apartheid. 
The basis for this is apartheid’s role in the provision of cheap labor, particularly in 
establishing a migratory labor system. As Longford puts it: “Behind all the different 
manifestations of apartheid stands the mighty economic machine of South African 
capitalism. This machine absorbs cheap black labor, puts it through the wheels of 
industry, mining and agriculture and then expels it to distant reservations for the 
unemployed until the system requires more labor” (2). However, Lipton’s recent and 
thorough study, Capitalism and Apartheid, suggests a more sophisticated analysis. She 
shows “Apartheid cannot simply be explained as the outcome of capitalism or of racism. 
Its origins lie in a complex interaction between class interests (of white labor as well as 
of sections of capital) and racism/ethnicity, reinforced by ideological and security 
factors” (3). It is made clear that while South African mining, agricultural and labor 
interests were generally served by apartheid, often the interests of manufacturing were 
not. The limits to black advancement have also placed constraints on South African 
manufacturing industry. 
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Yet although it might be argued that some ‘sections of capital’ would wish to see and 
benefit from an end to apartheid, it does not necessarily follow that they have the power 
to achieve this. Moreover, short term interests often preside and, perhaps as a 
consequence of this, the interests of business and the upholders of apartheid frequently 
seem less than mutually exclusive. Yet if the pronouncements in opposition to apartheid 
coming from the business community are more than empty rhetoric, what is business 
doing, within its powers, to end apartheid? 
One test of the business community’s commitment to fighting apartheid is the extent to 
which codes of conduct have been adopted and applied. There are a number of codes 
governing firms operating in South Africa. As well as the EEC Code of Conduct, 
addressed in this paper, there are (or were) the Sullivan Principles covering American 
firms, codes for Canadian and Australian firms, and other South African codes such as 
the government’s SACCOLA code (4). Those codes originating from outside South 
Africa are an attempt to dismantle apartheid within individual firms in South Africa, to 
set an example to South African firms, and to show, in a wider sense, that apartheid is 
not necessary. Codes generally, in addition to setting standards, ensure that the 
individual firm wishing to be socially responsible, is not put at a competitive 
disadvantage relative to other firms in its industry. They often work through the 
provision of information which embarrasses recalcitrant firms. 
Codes of conduct for firms operating in South Africa have, with the demise of the 
constructive engagement argument, fallen into general disrepute. Indeed, Leon Sullivan 
has distanced himself from the code which he developed and organised;. he is now 
advocating disinvolvement as a more appropriate action for American firms (5). The 
bridge-building and ‘reform from within’ of constructive engagement has come to be 
seen as tacit support for apartheid. The upsurge in the unrest in South Africa since 
1984 would seem to highlight the failure of this policy to achieve any real change. The 
contribution of business to constructive engagement is seen, likewise, to have been 
inadequate. There would then appear to be some support for the argument about the 
convergence of interest between business in South Africa and the upholders of apartheid. 
Of course, if this is the case then it is less than surprising that codes of conduct should 
be ineffective. And yet, already, following the exodus of American and (some) British 
firms, there are claims that disinvestment as a sanction can backfire (6). It is within 
such a context that this paper presents a reassessment of the EEC Code of Conduct and 
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the scope for its contribution to the creation of a non-racial, democratic nation of South 
Africa. 
THE EEC CODE: ORIGINS, PURPOSE AND FORM 
The EEC Code of Conduct for Companies with Interests in South Africa has its origins 
in a 1974 UK Code of Practice for companies operating in South Africa (7). This was 
recommended by the Trade and Industry Sub-Committee of the House of Commons 
Select Committee on Expenditure in March 1974 and subsequently accepted by the 
government. It was in response to the public outcry following newspaper reports of the 
low wages paid by British firms in South Africa. Articles by Adam Raphael published 
in the Guardian in March 1973 revealed that only three out of a hundred British 
companies investigated were paying all their employees above the poverty line. Raphael 
commented, “British companies may wish to behave well and many believe they are 
doing so . . . but in many cases the wish has yet to be put into practice”. His articles 
prompted wage improvements; Courtaulds doubled the wages for some of their workers, 
with the Courtaulds chairman observing “The tide of publicity has helped us to 
accelerate along the path on which we were already going . . . we try to push things along, 
not because we are saints, but because we think we owe it to ourselves” (8). 
Such statements cut no ice with the Anti-Apartheid movement. Raphael’s expose 
confirmed the link between low wages in South Africa and high profits for British 
companies operating there and that there was little evidence of industrialization breaking 
down apartheid, as documented in the earlier study by First et al, The South African 
Connection (9). Accordingly, submissions to the Commons Select Committee by Anti- 
Apartheid in 1973, advocated disinvestment and were in opposition to the strategy of 
codes of conduct on the grounds that British companies should not be in South Africa 
(under apartheid) at all. Similarly, Anti-Apartheid’s statement to the UN conference in 
Lagos, August 1977, rejected the code of conduct and urged trade sanctions when it was 
mooted that the British code would be adopted by the EEC. Anti-Apartheid believed 
these measures were timely interventions by the government against pressures for 
disinvestment (10). 
The adoption of the EEC Code was hasty. The British (Labour) government of the day 
was somewhat embarrassed by reports of progress being made in the United States in 
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support of the embryo Sullivan Principles. At the time they covered a commitment to 
improving black living conditions, training and promotion, and more specifically 
promised non-segregation in cafeterias, washrooms and the workplace; equal and fair 
employment practices; and equal pay for comparable work. The embarrassment was all 
the more acute as American firms constituted only 16% of total foreign investment 
compared to the 57% of the EEC, with Britain the largest investor of all. 
The code was drafted by two Foreign office officials, one in London and the other in 
Pretoria. The rush to get something out perhaps explains its unusual, if not radical 
wording. The code was adopted at the strong insistence of the British Foreign Secretary, 
David Owen, at a Brussels meeting in September 1977 of the foreign ministers of the 
nine member states of the EEC. It met with some criticism from Germany and in 
Britain, the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) and the Trades Union Congress 
(TUC). However, the TUC changed their views when their contribution to the code was 
brought to their attention. The CBI, as later discussed, also came to approve of the code 
(11). 
The code was voluntary. In the guidance provided to British companies it is noted that 
“the government urges United Kingdom companies with interests in South Africa to 
make every effort to promote the adoption of the policies and practices recommended in 
the Code of Conduct to the fullest possible extent” (12, emphasis added). Companies 
are “asked” to provide reports. However, it is emphasised that the guidance does not ask 
companies to act contrary to South African law (13), in accordance with government 
policy that UK companies and their affiliates should keep to the laws of the countries in 
which they operate. Moreover, the guidance makes clear that “It is in the interests of 
companies themselves that they should maintain the best employment practices in South 
Africa and be seen to do so”. The provisions of the code refer to: 
1) Relations within the undertaking, particularly the recognition and encouragement 
of trade unions. The code states: “Companies should ensure that all their 
employees irrespective of racial or other distinction are allowed to choose freely 
and without any hindrance the type of organisation to represent them”. 
2) Migrant labor - described as “an instrument of the policy of apartheid” - the 
effects of which employers “should make it their concern to alleviate”. 
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3) 
4) 
5) 
6) 
7) 
Pay, which should initially exceed by at least 50% the minimum level required to 
satisfy the basic needs of an employee and his family, ie: above the Minimum 
Effective Level (MEL). 
Wage structure and black advancement, particularly equal pay for equal work and 
training programs for blacks. 
Fringe benefits; the improvement of employees’ living conditions and the use of 
company funds in providing housing, transport, leisure, education facilities, etc. 
Desegregation at work and equal working conditions. 
Reporting; companies should report annually on these provisions to their national 
government which should review progress made. 
Reporting requirements of companies vary according to the amount of equity held by a 
(British) company and the number of black employees. The code principally refers to 
those with more than 50°h of the equity of a South African company and employing 20 
or more black Africans. Those companies meeting the number of black employees 
criterion but with a minority shareholding (exceeding 10% of the equity), were 
“encouraged” rather than “expected” to publish information on their performance against 
the code and “expected” to use their influence to seek to have the code put into effect. 
So, for example, the 1984 analysis of companies’ reports for 1982-83 is based on 142 
reports from companies meeting the former criteria, known as Category A; 9 reports 
from companies meeting the latter criteria, Category B; and 30 reports from other 
companies (14). Twelve companies had not submitted reports and were expected to do 
so. These companies are listed and include John Brown, Gallaher and Trusthouse Forte. 
(It is noted however that some of these companies have stated it is not their policy to 
submit a report and inclusion in this list does not necessarily mean failure to comply 
with the standards suggested in the code.) Moreover, just as reporting is voluntary, so is 
compliance with the code’s provisions for those that do choose to report. Government 
policy at the time was not to identify firms reporting but failing to conform with the 
code’s provisions, although prior to the Tory administration (commencing in 1979), the 
Labour government had been less relaxed about the code and “kicked companies quite 
hard” (15). 
7 
The main political purpose of the code, as Robin Smith explains, “was an attempt to 
counter the view that Europe’s vast financial interests in South Africa were blinding it 
to the fate of the millions of non-whites under apartheid” (16). Until the limited EEC 
trade sanctions agreed at the end of October 1986, the code was the only economic 
measure taken against South Africa by the EEC. It was also seen as useful in ensuring 
fairness of competition as the 1977 code covered other European countries as well as 
Britain (17). For companies, it provided a means of defending involvement in South 
Africa. As the extract quoted above indicates, it was in their interests to be seen to be 
maintaining the best employment practices; though, of course, it also encouraged this 
and indicated what actions firms might take. In comparison with the Sullivan Principles 
at the time, the EEC code was largely concerned with employment practices (18). 
The code met with many criticisms, as described in more detail below. Some, such as 
Anti-Apartheid viewed it as the wrong or an inadequate measure. Others criticised its 
form and operation: the voluntary reporting and compliance requirement, its static nature 
(unlike the ‘ratcheting-up’ each year of the targets to which Sullivan signatories should 
aspire), pay being the only pass or fail criterion, and the vagueness or general 
specification of most of its provisions. There were also anomalies within the reporting 
procedures of the various EEC countries. A report by the European Parliament, 
endorsed by a wide range of political groups, was highly critical. It said “totally 
inadequate” monitoring had allowed European businesses to wriggle out of the code. It 
proposed that foreign ministers should submit an annual report on the effectiveness of 
their country’s anti-apartheid efforts (19). 
In the light of developments in South Africa and the requirement for clarification of 
certain parts of the code, the foreign ministers of the ten member states of the European 
Community (EC) approved a revised code in November 1985. Although reported as 
“controversial” (20), the code, introduced in the UK in July 1986, remained voluntary 
and did not ask companies to act contrary to South African law. Principal new 
provisions were: the encouragement of black businesses, in particular, through sub- 
contracting and providing assistance to black employees to set up their own companies; 
to provide greater support for black trade unions; to help migrant workers lead a family 
life; to pay greater attention to education, training, black career development and wider 
community projects; and to ensure all EC companies observe identical procedures and 
reporting requirements. National summary reports were also to be produced (21). On 
release of the new code, the UK Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) stressed that 
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most of the 170 British firms with interests in South Africa already followed the new 
guidelines as normal practice and implementing the code would present them with few, 
if any, problems (22). 
PERSPECTIVES ON THE CODE 
While it is conceded that a lot of the foregoing and following discussion refers to British 
use of the European code, it should be recognized that not only is there assumed to be 
many similarities between Britain and its EEC partners, but that Britain has always been 
the largest foreign investor in South Africa and probably continues to be, though reliable 
figures on the size of this investment are not currently available (23). The UN figures 
for countries which have companies operating in South Africa highlight the extent to 
which the code is principally of relevance to the UK and West Germany. These figures 
are shown in Table 1. 
HOME COUNTRY TOTAL No OF COMPANIES* 
Belgium 6 
Denmark 2 
France 20 
West Germany 142 
Italy 7 
Netherlands 17 
Portugal 1 
Spain 1 
UK 360 
Table 1: EC Countries with Companies with Interests in South Africa (24) 
In the light of the figures given in Table 1 it is probably not surprising that in debates 
on trade and other sanctions on South Africa the UK and to a lesser extent West 
Germany are opposed to sanctions, while Denmark, Netherlands, Ireland, Greece and 
Spain are in favour (other EC countries tend to be ambivalent). The UK and West 
Germany also have substantial trade interests (25). 
* Corporations are hated if they hold, either directly or indirectly, more than 10% of the equity of subsidiaries, 
aarociates or affiliates in South Africa. 
The perspectives of the various interested parties to the code can be grouped into three 
main categories: those who believe the code is the right action and sufficient; those who 
consider it inadequate and would wish to see it strengthened, and possibly additional 
measures taken as well; and those who consider it to be the wrong action and would 
prefer alternative measures. It need hardly be added that views on the code’s 
appropriateness and effectiveness are closely allied to the interests of the party 
concerned. 
The UK government view, as expressed by the DTI, is that “the code shows British 
companies are a force for good in South Africa and it has improved conditions for the 
black community.” In terms of any broader role in dismantling apartheid, the code is 
seen as “a step in the right direction” (26). This view is echoed by business interest 
groups. The United Kingdom South Africa Trade Association (UKSATA), represent the 
interests of UK companies with investments or trade with South Africa. In 1982 its 
position was clearly supportive: 
“These codes remain instruments of progress, and their true significance should not 
be overlooked by their critics. Companies which operate in South Africa know 
that within that environment the codes have contributed to the improvements and, 
in some cases, only at the expense of some pain to the corporation” (27). 
The CBI is said to confirm this view (28) and has more recently asserted the desirability 
of a British industrial presence in South Africa to help create wealth there, while at the 
same time condemned apartheid (29). In January 1986, following discussions between 
the CBI and UKSATA, a new group representing British South African interests was 
formed: the British Industry Committee on South Africa (BICSA). This was in response 
to the rapid changes in South Africa and the need for specific and dedicated attention to 
the South African scene if British industry’s views and interests were to be represented 
(30). While set up to oppose sanctions (31), a BICSA spokesman said the association 
welcomed the code and believed it to be useful. He said returns showed significant 
improvements in pay, conditions and desegregation - which may well have happened 
anyway but were perhaps encouraged by the code. He added that it is difficult to say 
whether there was any effect on the wider political scenario, but it was hoped there 
would be in the long term (32). Michael Ivens, another representative of British 
industry, uses figures relating to the code’s provisions to substantiate his claim that 
“British companies are playing a prominent part in assisting black development in South 
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Africa” (33). It is thought likely that similar views would be espoused by the affected 
governments and representatives of business interests in other countries in the EC. The 
governments of countries such as Denmark would, given their pro-sanctions stance, 
probably be more critical of the code. 
Support for codes of conduct can also be found in South Africa. While the South 
African government’s initial response to the codes was one of irritation - at an external 
intervention - it is suggested that they came to be welcomed as a measure to ensure good 
treatment of South African employees (34). Anti-Apartheid believes they are approved 
of by the South African government because they reduce the requirement for 
government action to modernise apartheid, which might alienate conservatives in the 
National Party. They suggest the government recognizes the need for black managers in 
the Bantustans (35). Additionally, because the codes attacked some of the constraints on 
manufacturing firms in securing labor (such as the job bar), many South African 
businesses saw codes, including those from overseas, as useful (36). 
The second group of perspectives on the code comprises the views of those who consider 
it inadequate and would wish to see it strengthened and possibly additional measures as 
well. The European Parliament (presumably with the exception of the representatives 
from the UK and West Germany) would like the code to be mandatory and has passed a 
resolution to that effect (37). This, however, would be difficult to achieve because of 
the problem of ‘extra-territoriality’ - “the argument that no country can assert powers 
over a legal entity registered in another” (38) - and the legislation which South Africa 
has to prevent this (as does the UK and most other countries). In South Africa, the 
opposition politician Helen Suzman has suggested that companies not adhering to the 
codes should be penalised (39). The socialist group Agenor has made the same 
suggestion, proposing fines for those companies in breach of the code or failing to 
provide adequate information. However, they also see a role for additional measures 
such as the restriction or termination of access for South Africa to International 
Monetary Fund loans. More stringent measures, they argue, would be forthcoming once 
non-implementation of the code was fully demonstrated. Hence their support is tactical, 
though again flawed in its dependence on making the code mandatory (40). 
Trade unionists and many public interest groups argue that the code is better than 
nothing. For UK trade unionists the line is one of recognising its uses in setting 
standards that have to be met (41). In South Africa, black trade unionists would 
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acknowledge its role in applying leverage on firms but not consider it particularly 
important. They are thought to be generally sceptical of external efforts to end 
apartheid, but appreciate the support and funding of the international trade union 
movement (42). War on Want suggest it is “a measure against apartheid but not enough” 
(43) and Counter Information Services suggest codes “are marginally better than nothing”, 
but see more likelihood of success with disinvolvement (44). The latter group has 
highlighted the case of Consolidated Gold Fields (CGF) and strongly condemned the 
practices of its subsidiary Gold Fields of South Africa (GFSA). It is reported to have 
the reputation for paying the lowest wages in the industry, yet CGF does not report 
under the code because of its affiliate relationship with GFSA, it is implied that this is 
to get round the code. Accordingly, Counter Information Services would like to see the 
code improved by extending its coverage to associate companies, as well as making it 
mandatory and with stiffer provisions (45). 
The third group of perspectives on the code comprises the views of those who consider 
it the wrong action and would prefer alternative measures. Essentially, they want no 
truck with constructive engagement. Anti-Apartheid see it as a means of alleviating the 
consequences of apartheid in firms and yet also having the latent role of modernising 
apartheid. They don’t believe it has done anything to dismantle apartheid and would 
wish to see external pressure applied in the form of trade sanctions and disinvestment 
(46). Likewise, the African National Congress (ANC) believe it has not achieved very 
much and that the code “is based on reforming apartheid when the ANC wants to 
destroy apartheid”. They are not very excited about it (47). The views of those who 
believe it is inadequate, is perhaps best summed-up in the expression: ‘it’s like 
rearranging the deck-chairs on the Titanic’ (48). 
Obviously the parties whose opinions are expressed above represent only a small sample 
of the many parties with an interest in the issue. However, it is felt that the three main 
positions identified and the general tendencies revealed would hold if extended to a 
larger sample (assuming this was practicable). 
OUTCOMES OF THE CODE 
Outcomes of the code are beneficial and adverse, in terms of its impact on corporate 
behavior in South Africa. The main beneficial outcomes can be identified by reference 
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to code of conduct reports, as follows. There are also less obvious outcomes, some of 
which have been indicated above, and the impact of the code on apartheid outside the 
firm. These outcomes also need to be considered. 
Beneficial outcomes of the code, in terms of corporate compliance with its provisions, 
are highlighted in the annual DTI report. As this makes comparisons against all 
previous years when the code has been operating, the latest report will where possible be 
used here (49). Table 2 shows the number of companies who have reported in each of 
the twelve month periods since the original code was introduced. The subsequent 
analysis in the report is based on the data from the Category A companies. The drop in 
the number of companies not reporting, but believed to have an obligation to do so, 
reflects increased compliance with the code (and also therefore affects summary statistics 
as more companies are included), but may also reflect disposals and reductions of South 
African holdings. 
12 month period up to 30 June in 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 
Category A 147 153 142 141 137 142 
Category B 16 19 14 13 11 9 
Others 21 33 28 36 34 30 
TOTALS 184 205 184 190 182 181 
Companies not 
reporting 
47 
109 
19 
140 
18 13 
Category A 
reports received 
in time for full 
analysis 
133 127 
13 
130 
12 
139 
137 
13 
21 
171 
10 
137 
135 126 
15 16 
22 18 
172 160 
3 
135 
2 
126 
Table 2: Comoanies ReDortina Under the Code 
Changes in the provisions for relations within the undertaking makes comparisons 
between 1986 and 1985 difficult, so Table 3 uses figures from the 1985 report (50). It 
shows improvement in the formal recognition of and dealing with black unions, but little 
improvement in the willingness to recognize such unions with or without conditions. 
Moreover, only very general indications are sought under this provision. 
13 
12 month period up to 30 June in 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
Number of Category A 
reports 
109 140 133 127 130 
In-house liaison or 
consultative 
committees, etc 
83 102 99 91 99 
Formal recognition of 
independent black 
trade unions 
7 9 12 
Informal dealings with 
black trade unions 
7 9 
Willingness to recognize 
such unions with or 
without conditions 
37 38 
Formal recognition of 8 9 9 
established registered 
unions 
8 13 
139 
77 
29 
29 
55 
10 
137 
93 
41 
28 
51 
8 
135 
76 
58 
32 
43 
11 
Table 3: Relations Within the Undertaking 
Under the migrant labor provisions, the 1986 report shows an increase in the number of 
companies reporting the use of migrant labor from 27 in 1978 to 48 in 1985. This 
probably reflects increased reporting. The 1987 report shows 36 companies reporting the 
use of migrant labor. The total number of migrant workers employed by British 
subsidiaries remains at about 11,000, 80% of which are employed by one company. The 
numbers employed by other companies are said to be usually only a small proportion of 
their total workforce. Various benefits are reportedly provided for migrant workers and 
some companies have reported that they were trying to phase out the use of their 
migrant labor force. 
On pay and wage structures, almost all Category A companies reported that they applied 
the principle of equal pay for equal work. Table 4 shows reports filed on pay. Just 
over 96% of the companies pay above the Minimum Effective Level (equivalent to 
SLLS). However, it should be noted that there have been many criticisms of the 
accuracy of the figures reported. 
14 
12 month period up to 30 June in 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 
Number of 
Category A reports 
Thousands of black 
African workers 
Thousands paid above 
SLLS (or equivalent) 
96 of all black African 
employees paid above 
SLLS 
Thousands paid below 
SLLS 
% of all black African 
employees paid below 
SLLS 
109 140 133 127 130 
98 105 118 129 134 
85 85 102 119 123 
87 81 81 92 92 
13 20 16 10 11 
13 19 19 8 8 
139 
113 
102 
90.1 
11 
9.9 
137 
104 
98.9 
94.8 
135 126 
95.8 79.1 
88.5 76.1 
92.4 96.2 
5.5 7.3 3.0 
5.2 7.6 3.8 
Table 4: Pav Levels 
Most companies report compliance, and figures have increased, under the provisions for 
training and promotion of black employees and fringe benefits. Donations to community 
projects, such as the Urban Foundation have also increased. Desegregation 
improvements are shown in Table 5, showing a marked increase in reported total 
desegregation. (It should be noted that during the period under review, South African 
regulations were eased.) A number of companies reported encouragement of black 
business. 
In sum then, the reports under the code would indicate improvements in British 
businesses in South Africa. Accepting the reports as accurate, it would appear that these 
companies have gone some way towards black trade union recognition and a long way 
towards desegregation. Most now pay at an acceptable level and many provide training 
and promotion opportunities to blacks and support community projects. Of course, these 
changes may have taken place anyway, but even the strongest critics of codes of conduct 
accept that they have improved conditions within individual firms in South Africa. Yet 
to what extent have they contributed to the dismantling of apartheid outside the firm? 
There is little evidence of any significant impact on this front. 
15 
12 month period up to 30 June in 
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 
Number of Category A reports 127 130 139 137 
Policy on desegregation stated 97 80 107 111 
Total desegregation 22 27 36 37 
Desegregation at the workplace N/A 94 110 115 
Desegregation of canteens N/A 16 17 17 
Desegregation of toilets N/A 24 43 41 
Desegregation of education 
and training 
N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Desegregation of sports facilities N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Constraints of law and Government 
policy mentioned 
40 23 33 32 40 
Constraints of custom, attitudes 
and practice mentioned 
11 13 6 4 5 
.135 126 
128 123 
40 76 
117 117 
50 88 
54 82 
WA 92 
90 
15 
9 
Table 5: Desegregation of Places of Work 
Adverse outcomes of the codes should also be acknowledged. These include the 
problems posed for the companies operating in industries where pay norms are notably 
low. Quinton Hazell, for example, submitted a report to the DTI in 1984, but noted 
that its failure to comply with the code was because it is “a labor intensive company 
operating in a highly competitive market” (51). Pritchard Services Group, in its 1985 
submission, reveals that 1,660 of its 2,000 black cleaners and security staff were paid 
below the poverty line. The company subsequently left South Africa (52). It’s widely 
suggested that firms chose to make their low-paid employees redundant and sub-contract 
the services they provided to obtain compliance with the code. 
Another outcome of the code, and many would argue its real purpose, is to detract from 
the criticism of the role of companies in maintaining apartheid and provide them with a 
shield against their critics (53), and, in addition, give tangible support to the 
government’s constructive engagement argument. As a sop to public opinion, it used to 
be possible to cite the code and refer to improvements under the code in discussions 
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with bodies such as the TUC and church organisations. However, with the demise of 
constructive engagement, this is now considered no longer possible (54). 
CONCLUSION: A CONTRIBUTION TO THE DISMANTLING OF APARTHEID? 
On balance, while it may be claimed that the code has improved the conditions of 
workers in EC firms in South Africa, it seems unlikely that it has done much overall to 
dismantle apartheid. Its failure in this role is related and partly attributable to the 
failure of the much greater strategy of constructive engagement. If such a strategy is a 
genuine effort to end apartheid (55) then it may be that, given time, a more stringent 
and mandatory code would have made a significant contribution to this. However, the 
code as it stands could never be expected to achieve a great deal. While it could “show 
it’s a lie that British firms are exploiting their South African workers” (56) and, indeed, 
improve their working situation, it could never really challenge apartheid. If reform 
through business is possible (and, of course, not just the modernisation of apartheid), 
then the only real role in this of the EC code is in allowing UK firms to stay in South 
Africa and make an economic contribution. 
Why should businesses takes an interest and try to improve conditions in South Africa’? 
Historically, it appears most firms will only do so if it is in their interests, in fear of 
penalties or adverse publicity. (As the Economist commented in explanation of 
disinvestment: “The reason for the flight from South Africa is that no businessman wants 
to be caught propping up a government whose social policy leads to the sjamboking and 
shooting of people on television” (57).) This is even more the case if it is hoped that 
firms will fight apartheid, for few businesses would wish to identify for themselves such 
an overtly political role. Accordingly, the EC code could be considerably improved if 
there were sanctions against firms that didn’t report, didn’t comply, or didn’t show 
progress. Failure to report has been less of a problem in recent years. Publicity has 
been focused on the non-reporters rather than those companies which do not comply; 
this, of course, is partly due to a lack of information on which companies are failing to 
comply. If the problems in making the code mandatory are insurmountable - though 
they do not seem to preclude a mandatory reporting requirement for parent companies - 
there could at least be public exposure of those companies failing to meet the code’s 
provisions. Some of these companies may be susceptible to public pressure. Last, but 
not least, the code’s provisions need to be strengthened and continued improvement 
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sought from individual firms. This would mean a ‘ratcheting-up’ mechanism similar to 
the Sullivan code with a competitive element such that firms were constantly encouraged 
to improve against rising targets. There would also be a greater number of pass/fail 
criteria. However, if too stringent and difficult to meet, codes might force unintended 
disinvestment. 
Yet one must not only ask whether business has the will to challenge apartheid but also 
whether it has the means. Although Lipton highlights the achievements of international 
pressures on South Africa, she is careful to show that these measures can only have an 
impact on apartheid if they affect those in a position of power to do anything about it. 
Business may only be able to do so much. An understanding of how much can be 
achieved is important if codes and other constructive engagement measures are to be 
employed. 
Finally, there must be clarity of aims (58). Sanctions work through conversion, 
accommodation or coercion. Is it expected that the South African authorities are going 
to be converted to a new perspective, coerced into ending apartheid, or not converted 
but obliged to make some (adequate) changes ? Isolation, symbolic action or intervention 
may be the method in all three cases. Effective codes within a policy of constructive 
engagement makes sense if conversion or accommodation is sought. Importantly, it 
should be recognized that even if codes amount to largely symbolic action, they do have 
a useful expressive function. They are a statement about the morality of apartheid, 
which is useful in reinforcing international morality as well as contributing to a sense of 
isolation in South Africa. Disinvestment, even if more token than real (59) is, likewise, 
a contribution to isolation and also therefore trying to achieve conversion. Yet there are 
many people, and their number seems to be increasing, who believe the end of apartheid 
is only likely to be achieved through the coercion of the South African authorities. If 
this is the case, then the trade and other negative sanctions required make codes of 
conduct redundant. 
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